

FLOW HIJACKED · RESEARCH

# The Fifth Chair

An Existential Conversation  
About the Life We Actually Live

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Viktor Frankl

Erich Fromm

Simone de Beauvoir

Hartmut Rosa

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48 references · 24 primary + 24 secondary

Four position files · Eight human tensions

Research phase only. Philosophical disagreements remain open.

Tomer's position and the Flow Hijacked synthesis are reserved for the next phase.

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Source codes throughout the dossier link to the evidence ledger. Each entry identifies the work, its contribution, and the portions examined. F09 and E11 have bounded-preview access; longer works were examined selectively as stated in the ledger.

# Part I — The Problem

The central problem is how someone can meaningfully take responsibility for a life whose starting conditions, available relationships, social vocabulary, bodily possibilities, and historical circumstances were never entirely chosen. Neither complete self-authorship nor complete determination adequately states the question. The issue is what choosing, loving, changing, and answering for oneself can mean within such a life.

A second question concerns ownership: what makes a life recognizably mine? First-person sincerity, independence, continuity, moral responsibility, and a satisfying relationship with the world are different possible answers. They must not be treated as interchangeable. A person might sincerely want a socially prescribed career, independently pursue an impoverished ideal, or undergo a transformation that makes an earlier commitment seem foreign.

This dossier reconstructs four positions before comparing them. Frankl examines the person's answer to meaning; Fromm investigates the formation and productive exercise of human powers; Beauvoir develops an ethics of ambiguous, situated freedom; Rosa investigates socially organized relationships with the world. These descriptions identify starting questions, not four equivalents or a predetermined synthesis.

## Scope, evidence, and reading limits

The evidence corpus contains **exactly 48 separately identifiable works or contributions: 12 per thinker, comprising 6 primary and 6 secondary sources**. A separately authored introduction counts independently of the primary essay it interprets. A reprint, translation, hosting page, or second link to the same work does not

create another reference. For the two Rosa interviews, only Rosa's answers are primary evidence. Works mentioned inside selected references are not silently added to the corpus.

"Examined" means the relevant original text was inspected; it does **not** mean every page of every selected book was read. The ledger specifies selected chapters and access limits. In particular, **F09 is restricted to the original first-page preview and abstract; E11 to published opening passages from two chapters.** E01 is directly examined through its substantive appendix; B03 through its introduction and conclusion in the older, abridged Parshley translation. Claims requiring other parts of these works are supported by the selected scholarship or expressly limited. No major conclusion rests solely on a bounded preview.

The dossier distinguishes **reconstruction** of a position, **criticism** by an identified interpreter, and **comparative inference** developed here. The matrix and dialogue preparation are reasoned reconstructions, not records of exchanges that occurred. Contemporary examples are hypothetical applications, not newly researched empirical findings. There are no invented quotations and no passages presented as a thinker's verbatim speech.

Source codes lead to the evidence ledger. T1-T8 designate the eight tensions established in Part VI. A claim that remains disputed is left disputed. The dossier does not research Tomer's position or use Flow Hijacked to adjudicate the four thinkers.

# Part II — Viktor Frankl — Position File

## 1. Freedom

Frankl defends a specifically human capacity to take a position toward conditions rather than freedom from having conditions. This is a finite, existential and spiritual freedom, not unlimited practical choice. “Spiritual” here names the noetic dimension of personhood and need not mean religious affiliation. Yet his claim is stronger than the modest observation that some choices sometimes remain: he treats freedom as irreducible to psychophysical causation. That philosophical commitment should be presented openly, rather than quietly translated into a contemporary empirical theory of variable capacity. (F03; F06; F08)

## 2. Constraint

Biology, psychological dispositions, illness, imprisonment, poverty, and mortality are real conditions. Frankl acknowledges material means as ordinarily necessary for fulfilling many meanings; meaning is not a replacement for food or political change. Nevertheless, he refuses to let these conditions exhaust the person. An important distinction follows: the dignity attributed to a person is not the same as the person’s demonstrable ability to deliberate or respond at a particular moment. Batthyány’s clinical reconstruction helps establish that distinction, although it does not remove every overstatement in Frankl’s own rhetoric. (F03; F04; F11)

## 3. Agency

Agency involves self-distancing and self-transcendence: a person can take some distance from symptoms or impulses and orient toward a task or another person. It is not simply stronger introspection or force of will. Frankl rejects the idea that willing meaning can

manufacture a meaningful object; meaningful possibilities must become apparent. Clinical assistance may help disclose possibilities and interrupt disabling preoccupation. Whether that assistance succeeds is a separate question from the philosophical affirmation of personhood. The selected clinical review describes therapeutic practice; it does not establish universal voluntary control. (F05; F07; F11)

## 4. Responsibility

Responsibility concerns answering the concrete demands and possibilities of a particular situation. It is not responsibility for originating every condition or determining every outcome. A therapist should not substitute their own values for the patient's conscience. However, Frankl sometimes connects attributing guilt with respecting dignity so strongly that the limits of culpability remain underdeveloped. His position cannot honestly be made into a finished account of diminished responsibility. The dossier therefore distinguishes his ethical appeal to answer for oneself from an independently justified judgment that a particular person could have acted otherwise. (F03; F06; F12)

## 5. Meaning

Meaning is discovered in the encounter between this person and this unrepeatable situation; it is not an arbitrary preference or a generic long-term goal. Creating, experiencing and loving, and responding to unavoidable suffering are different ways of fulfilling it. Conscience is the fallible discernment of a demand, not a guarantee that one's conviction is correct. Frankl also allows an ultimate meaning beyond finite comprehension, but concrete meaningful action does not require possessing an explanatory account of the universe. His confidence that meaning remains possible exceeds what therapeutic outcome studies could demonstrate. (F01; F03; F09; F10)

## 6. Selfhood and authenticity

A person is not exhausted by a diagnosis, a drive, or a social role. But becoming oneself is not primarily the discovery and expression of an inner preference. Frankl places the person beyond self-enclosure: fulfillment follows devotion to something or someone other than the self. Self-actualization is consequently a possible byproduct, not the direct target. This account preserves uniqueness while refusing to make personal satisfaction the measure of truth or value. Pytell questions whether the resulting anthropology successfully avoids a renewed separation of spirit and psychophysical life. (F04; F05; F12)

## 7. Social formation

Frankl recognizes conformity, manipulation, and the absence of inherited guidance as dangers. He does not offer Fromm's detailed account of the social production of character. His polemical target is the claim that identifying causal conditions fully explains away the meaning toward which someone strives. This makes his work valuable against reductive explanation but less developed for determining how a conscience itself acquires prejudices. Fallibility is acknowledged; a comprehensive social genealogy of conscience is not supplied in this corpus. (F01; F03; F06; F08)

## 8. Love and relationship

Love is an encounter with another person's singularity and possibilities, not merely gratification or the satisfaction of a drive. It is itself a way of encountering meaning. Self-transcendence therefore makes relationship constitutive of fulfillment, although Frankl does not derive every instance of freedom from mutual recognition or social reciprocity. His language of seeing what the beloved could become also requires care: it cannot legitimately authorize deciding another person's destiny for them. The latter limitation follows from his opposition to prescribing someone else's meaning, rather than from a fully developed political ethics of love. (F01; F03; F05)

## 9. Suffering

Frankl explicitly distinguishes avoidable suffering, whose causes should be changed, from suffering that cannot be removed. Suffering is not necessary for meaning, and unnecessary suffering is not an achievement. Where loss is irreversible, a meaningful response may remain possible; this does not retrospectively justify the injury or its perpetrator. Nevertheless, some texts rank the response to unavoidable suffering among the highest realizations of value. That elevation is a genuine feature of Frankl, not merely a popular distortion, and creates a risk of heroic expectations. A sufferer's inability to find meaning cannot be inferred to be a moral failure. (F01; F03; F12)

## 10. Change

Someone can change their relation to a condition, undertake a different task, or redirect concern beyond disabling self-preoccupation. Change need not mean recovering an earlier, undamaged self. Frankl also makes a stronger temporal claim: realized possibilities are preserved in the past rather than annihilated by passing time. The life already lived has a kind of secured reality. This is more than the ordinary claim that memories influence identity; it is a philosophical response to transience. Its consoling force and its justification must be evaluated separately. (F02; F05; F07)

## 11. Control

Action should address what can be changed, including biological, psychological, and political causes of suffering. Conversely, pleasure, fulfillment, and self-actualization can be frustrated by trying to command them directly. Frankl's approach is not universal surrender: it redirects effort toward meaningful objects and distinguishes an unchangeable condition from one's possible response. Nor is attitude a mental switch. The most defensible formulation is an invitation to investigate whatever response is

genuinely possible, accompanied by needed care, rather than a prior assurance that every person can summon a chosen attitude. (F01; F05; F07; F11)

## 12. Alienation

Frankl's closest central category is the existential vacuum: an experienced lack of meaning, often associated with boredom, conformity, or compensatory pursuits. This should not be equated with every depression or with Rosa's technical account of alienated world-relations. Nor does a feeling of meaninglessness establish that a person's life objectively lacks meaning. Logotherapy attempts to reopen attention to meaningful possibilities; its value commitments remain distinguishable from a clinical explanation of symptoms. (F01; F07; F09; F10)

## 13. The good life

A life goes well through responsible fulfillment of concrete meanings, including work, love, and the response to limits. Happiness is neither the only criterion nor something that can always be pursued directly. A life can retain worth when achievement and pleasure are severely restricted. Frankl's position is thus a defense against making success the condition of dignity; it is also a demanding normative anthropology whose strongest assurances cannot simply be classified as established psychological facts. (F02; F04; F08; F10)

**Qualification that must survive into the monograph.** Frankl combines a far-reaching affirmation of noetic freedom with clinical distinctions, recognition of material conditions, and an explicit demand to remove avoidable suffering. Those qualifications rule out crude positive thinking. They do not turn his universal language into a fully specified account of every impairment. The tension inside his position should remain visible. (F03; F06; F11; F12)

# Part III — Erich Fromm — Position File

## 1. Freedom

Freedom from inherited bonds and external authority can release a person while also producing isolation and insecurity. Freedom to live positively involves the active exercise of one's powers in love, thought, and work. Fromm therefore refuses to identify liberation with having more unconstrained choices. Escape into authoritarian submission, destructiveness, or conformity can answer the anxiety of freedom while undermining independence. The distinction between negative release and positive realization is reconstructed here from the selected interpretations alongside the original account of social character. (E01; E07; E09)

## 2. Constraint

Economic arrangements, family life, authority, and culturally rewarded conduct enter the person's character; they are not merely external obstacles confronting a finished individual. Fear and habitual orientations can make some responses deeply difficult or effectively unavailable. Human beings are nevertheless not infinitely malleable: Fromm posits persistent needs arising from the human situation, including relatedness and orientation. His account combines historical formation with a substantive conception of human possibilities. Cortina challenges parts of its underlying anthropology; it should not be presented as uncontested biological knowledge. (E02; E06; E09; E10)

## 3. Agency

Productiveness means actively exercising human powers in relation to oneself, others, and the world. It is not high output or commercial productivity. In *Man for Himself*, Fromm says decisions express

character; reason and conscience can help transform that character but do not stand outside it. Funk's reconstruction also draws on later formulations distinguishing determination at characterological extremes from real alternatives in other cases. These formulations should not be flattened into one timeless theory. Awareness and changed practice matter, but neither supplies an unconditioned will independent of its history. (E02, pp. 231–237; E05; E09)

## 4. Responsibility

Responsibility in love means responding to another's needs rather than possessing them or obeying a command. Moral evaluation requires a further distinction: in *Man for Himself*, Fromm separates judging a character's destructive qualities from assuming a superior authority entitled to condemn or absolve its bearer. Understanding overwhelming causes can remove accusatory superiority without changing the evaluation that human possibilities were damaged or unrealized. This is stronger than merely reducing blame in proportion to difficulty, and its severe language of moral failure remains troubling. His later account of real alternatives, reconstructed by Funk, introduces a differentiated account of choice without resolving every question of culpability. (E02, pp. 231–237; E04; E09)

## 5. Meaning

Fromm's principal concern is a productive orientation toward existence rather than discovering a unique objective task assigned by each situation. Humanistic ethics seeks standards in human flourishing: reason, love, growth, and the exercise of powers. In *To Have or To Be?*, meaning is not something an external authority or possession can confer on a passive recipient. A meaningful life is actively lived. This is not unrestricted subjectivism, because Fromm believes some orientations realize human possibilities better than others, irrespective of their popularity. (E02; E05; E11)

## 6. Selfhood and authenticity

The marketing orientation encourages a person to experience the self as an offering whose value depends on demand. Adaptability can then mean continually becoming whatever will sell. A life becomes one's own through the active exercise of powers, not through a perfectly distinctive public image. Fromm does posit a normative contrast between alienated existence and a more fully realized self, but not an untouched personality waiting outside history. Social formation is unavoidable; the question is which forms support living activity rather than self-commodification. (E02; E03; E07)

## 7. Social formation

**Yes: a person can sincerely experience a desire as their own even when it has been socially produced.** Social character channels energy so that people often want to do what their social order requires. No conscious deception is necessary. Three questions must remain distinct: whether the desire is sincerely felt, how it was formed, and whether its pursuit supports a productive life. Social origin alone does not make a desire false; otherwise language, love, and solidarity would be disqualified along with conformity. Fromm's critical standard concerns the quality of the resulting life, not an impossible absence of influence. (E01; E02; E07)

## 8. Love and relationship

Love is an active capacity expressed through care, responsibility, respect, and knowledge. It is not primarily the success of finding the right object or securing admiration. Mature union preserves the integrity of the participants: respect permits the other's development for their own sake. Discipline and practice can cultivate loving capacities, although they cannot make another person reciprocate. Some of Fromm's accounts retain dated assumptions about sex and gender; the defensible reconstruction does not promote those assumptions into universal descriptions of human relationship. (E04; E08)

## 9. Suffering

Some suffering belongs to mortality, separateness, and the impossibility of abolishing uncertainty. Much suffering is also socially produced and concealed by normality: widespread adaptation does not establish health. Becoming aware of suffering can initiate change when its sources and possible remedies become intelligible. That does not make suffering intrinsically valuable, a necessary rite of growth, or evidence of personal inadequacy. Fromm's contribution is especially strong against interpreting successful adjustment to damaging conditions as a sufficient therapeutic or ethical goal. (E03; E05; E10; E11)

## 10. Change

Change requires recognizing distress, understanding its sources, seeing a possible alternative, and changing practice. Individual transformation and social transformation must support one another; neither a purely inward conversion nor rearrangement of institutions automatically produces a humane life. What persists is not necessarily a fixed character configuration but the human capacities and needs through which different orientations become possible. Hope is active participation in an undetermined future, rather than confidence that progress is guaranteed or rescue will arrive from elsewhere. (E03; E05; E08; E12)

## 11. Control

Reason, discipline, and effective action matter, but possessing people and things can become a defensive response to insecurity. The having orientation seeks security by accumulation and control; the being orientation emphasizes living activity and participation. Fromm distinguishes possession necessary for life from characterological attachment to having, so the contrast is not an injunction to abandon shelter or material security. Love especially requires relinquishing domination without relinquishing responsibility. (E04; E05)

## 12. Alienation

Alienation occurs when human powers and products confront their producers as alien forces, and when people experience themselves through market value or external approval. Estrangement can coexist with excitement, comfort, or sincere satisfaction. The issue is therefore not merely an unpleasant feeling: it is the relation between the person, their powers, their activity, and the social organization of life. This gives Fromm a critical perspective on apparently voluntary participation, while also raising the question of who may legitimately judge another's reported fulfillment deficient. (E02; E03; E07; E11)

## 13. The good life

A good life develops reason, love, independence, solidarity, and productive relatedness. Joy matters, but gratification and social success are inadequate standards. Fromm supplies a substantive, though revisable, account of human fulfillment, not only a demand for freedom to choose one's values. Its strength is the ability to criticize desires rewarded by a society; its vulnerability is the need to justify the conception of human nature and maturity doing the criticizing. Universal ethical claims are not, for him, necessarily infallible or exempt from revision. (E02, pp. 238–241; E06; E10; E11)

**Qualification that must survive into the monograph.** Fromm's account neither abolishes personal initiative nor treats the individual as socially self-made. It makes the ability to choose and the experience of wanting historically and characterologically formed. His normative humanism explains why some forms of adaptation count as damaged life, but remains open to criticism concerning paternalism and the foundations of its human ideal. (E06; E09; E10)

# Part IV — Simone de Beauvoir — Position File

## 1. Freedom

Beauvoir's freedom is not adequately described as an otherwise absolute power with obstacles added afterward. Human existence projects beyond the given while remaining bodily, historical, and dependent on a world shared with others. Arp distinguishes ontological freedom, concrete possibilities of acting, and ethical freedom that wills freedom rather than fleeing it. These distinctions clarify why possessing the structure of projecting does not mean possessing equal opportunities or acting ethically. They also expose tensions among Beauvoir's formulations instead of guaranteeing their perfect consistency. (B01; B07; B08)

## 2. Constraint

Facticity includes the body, past, material situation, and the meanings others impose. Oppression actively narrows projects and can produce the apparent incapacity then cited to justify domination. Embodiment is not simply a prison enclosing an otherwise complete consciousness; possibilities are lived bodily and acquire significance in a situation. Deutscher shows why this approach must remain attentive to aging and bodily limitation, and why it can be difficult to distinguish imposed restriction, physical incapacity, and evasive resignation. That difficulty should not be solved by automatically blaming the person. (B03; B07; B11)

## 3. Agency

To act is to undertake projects in a world one did not create, disclosing possibilities through action. Ethical agency includes recognizing other people as freedoms rather than instruments of one's project. Concrete opportunities vary dramatically: someone

prevented from learning that alternatives exist cannot simply be charged with refusing them. Conversely, uncertainty about consequences does not release those with possibilities from judgment. Beauvoir refuses both a guaranteed innocence through abstention and a political necessity that allegedly eliminates choice. (B01; B05; B08; B09)

## 4. Responsibility

Responsibility concerns one's projects, one's means, and the situations one's actions help create for others. It does not entail authoring their inner response or controlling their future. In *An Eye for an Eye*, Beauvoir treats ignorance, circumstances, and possibilities of change as morally significant without concluding that explanation cancels judgment. She also defends severe punishment in the context of collaboration and atrocity. Her ethics is not a simple philosophy of forgiveness: the conflict among accountability, the offender's remaining humanity, and the irreversibility of harm remains acute. (B02; B04; B12)

## 5. Meaning

There is no external final standpoint that guarantees human projects in advance. Finite undertakings acquire significance through commitment and their opening toward other freedoms. This is not the claim that every chosen project is equally justified: an undertaking that suppresses the freedom enabling value contradicts the ethical demand. Nor can a final achievement permanently settle the justification of a life. Meaning must be sustained and exposed to a future one cannot secure. Beauvoir's ambiguity thus belongs to valuation itself, not merely to missing information. (B01; B02; B06; B10)

## 6. Selfhood and authenticity

A person cannot become an unchanging thing whose identity removes the need to choose. Authenticity, used cautiously, means assuming the ambiguity of being at once a subject and an object for

others, freedom and facticity, a separate person and a participant in a common world. It is not fidelity to a pre-social essence. A settled label such as hero, victim, professional, or failure never contains the whole future. Equally, invoking open possibility cannot make history or bodily dependence disappear. (B01; B06; B07; B11)

## 7. Social formation

Social hierarchy shapes what appears natural, possible, respectable, or unthinkable. The Second Sex examines how an imposed position becomes lived experience, not only a legal restriction. The distinction between accepting an assigned role and having no effective route beyond it is therefore ethically consequential and difficult. Beauvoir's critique of conventional wisdom also shows how fatalistic beliefs can protect privilege. The proper response is neither to treat every inherited norm as freely endorsed nor to assume social formation has eliminated every possibility of contestation. (B03; B06; B07; B11)

## 8. Love and relationship

Other people are not merely limits on my freedom. They help give projects a future beyond my private existence, and their freedom is an ethical concern intrinsic to mine. Reciprocity recognizes separate subjects without seeking fusion or unilateral absorption. Devotion can fail when it makes the other's life a vehicle for the giver's project. I can help alter conditions and make an appeal; I cannot live the other's freedom for them. Mutual dependence is consequently compatible with freedom, while domination disguised as self-sacrifice is not. (B02; B03; B10; B12)

## 9. Suffering

Beauvoir provides no general warrant for treating suffering as redemptive. Injury, oppression, and lost lives are not justified because a later history benefits. Political action may nevertheless involve harms and tragic choices that cannot be purified by good intentions. Responsibility then requires concrete judgment, scrutiny

of means, and acknowledgment of those sacrificed. Nor can liberation retrospectively restore every life damaged along the way. Her resistance to total justification should not be confused with an absolute prohibition on force in every circumstance. (B01; B04; B05; B09)

## 10. Change

A person remains open to projects and revision without escaping the sedimented reality of their past. Social change can enlarge concrete possibilities, but no transformation abolishes ambiguity or guarantees ethical conduct. Earlier projects may be taken up, relinquished, or reinterpreted; losses are not thereby fully recovered. Beauvoir's own development matters: Bergoffen and Kruks identify limitations in early formulations that protect interior freedom too sharply from circumstance. The dossier preserves that development rather than making every early essay express a finished theory of embodiment. (B01; B04; B09; B10)

## 11. Control

People should act on concrete conditions and resist oppression, but cannot secure a final justification, eliminate ambiguity, or compel another's genuinely free endorsement. Means matter because they partly constitute the future supposedly sought. In political life, neither absolute purity nor a claim to know history's necessities supplies a reliable escape from responsibility. In relationship, effective help does not authorize complete direction of the recipient. Control becomes ethically suspect when it converts another subject into the material of one's own successful project. (B02; B05; B09; B12)

## 12. Alienation

Beauvoir describes forms of estrangement in which people deny their freedom, absolutize a role or value, or are confined by others to an objectified position. These are not all the same phenomenon: oppressive objectification must not be collapsed into the oppressed person's evasiveness. A socially imposed identity can become a lived

limitation even when it is not freely embraced. Beauvoir's analysis is therefore particularly important where a critique of inauthenticity might otherwise turn into blame directed at those denied concrete possibilities. (B01; B03; B08; B11)

### 13. The good life

A life goes well through concrete projects that assume ambiguity and open possibilities for oneself and others. Happiness cannot by itself certify freedom: someone may be satisfied within a situation that prevents their development. Neither independence without reciprocity nor self-sacrifice that extinguishes the self supplies the ethical ideal. Beauvoir offers demanding criteria for how projects relate to freedom, but no recipe that resolves every conflict among particular people. Living well includes accepting that ethical judgment remains exposed to uncertainty and criticism. (B01; B03; B05; B12)

**Qualification that must survive into the monograph.** Ambiguity is constitutive: humans are subjects who can become objects, finite beings who project beyond the given, and separate persons whose undertakings depend on others. Greater justice can alter oppression without abolishing this condition. Beauvoir's position is consequently more than either a celebration of unconstrained choice or an inventory of constraints. (B01; B08; B10)

# Part V — Hartmut Rosa — Position File

## 1. Freedom

Rosa regards autonomy as a major emancipatory achievement, but doubts that self-determination alone adequately describes a good life. People also want to be reached by something that matters and to answer it in their own voice. Resonance therefore adds receptivity and transformation to the account of agency without simply abolishing autonomy. A relation imposed through domination cannot be redeemed merely by calling it resonant. How resonance should relate to independent standards of justice and autonomy remains an active dispute in the selected scholarship. (R04; R06; R07; R10)

## 2. Constraint

Modern societies characteristically reproduce their institutions through continued growth, innovation, and acceleration: Rosa calls this dynamic stabilization. Maintaining one's position can therefore demand continual movement. He distinguishes technological acceleration, accelerated social change, and the acceleration of the pace of life; they are connected but not identical. Unequal resources and institutional rhythms shape whether people can sustain responsive relationships. This is not the empirical claim that every process everywhere becomes faster: exclusion, waiting, congestion, and enforced inactivity can accompany acceleration. (R01; R05; R12)

## 3. Agency

In resonance, a person is affected, responds with a sense of efficacy and their own voice, and is transformed through a relation whose outcome cannot be fully predicted or secured. This joins activity with receptivity; it is not passive absorption. Agency is not simply maximizing intervention. Rosa's later reply also insists that the

language of voice and hearing must not become a test excluding people with particular disabilities. The relevant structure is responsiveness, not conformity to one sensory or communicative norm. (R03; R06; R10)

## 4. Responsibility

Rosa makes it difficult to assign individuals sole responsibility for relationships whose conditions are socially organized. A demand to become personally more resonant can reproduce the pressure to optimize oneself. Institutions can be assessed for the relationships they make possible or obstruct. However, resonance theory is not, in this corpus, a complete account of culpability, blame, or competing obligations. It would be an invention to attribute to Rosa a precise doctrine of diminished moral responsibility. His contribution changes the level of inquiry rather than finishing that doctrine. (R02; R06; R10; R12)

## 5. Meaning

Rosa shifts attention from possessing a justified life plan to experiencing and sustaining a responsive relationship with the world. Meaningfulness is implicated in being addressed and able to answer, but resonance is not simply another word for meaning or a belief in cosmic purpose. The other side of the relation must retain difference; merely hearing one's own values confirmed produces an echo rather than the relevant encounter. Whether resonance supplies sufficient ethical criteria, rather than drawing on them, remains disputed. (R03; R04; R08)

## 6. Selfhood and authenticity

A subject does not have to discover a finished inner identity and express it without alteration. Resonant encounters can change what a person wants and who they understand themselves to be. Having one's own voice is nevertheless necessary: merger, domination, or manipulation is not an adequate substitute. Rosa thus describes a

self capable of transformation through relation, not an isolated sovereign or a dissolved self. The relation's capacity to transform distinguishes it from uncomplicated reassurance. (R04; R05; R06)

## 7. Social formation

Institutions organize how the world is approached: as competition, resource, obstacle, commodity, or possible respondent. A culture organized around making more of the world available, accessible, and attainable can intensify control while failing to produce a responsive relationship. Preferences and projects are therefore embedded in social modes of relating. Rosa does not reproduce Fromm's account of social character, and this corpus does not warrant attributing a complete theory of unconscious desire to him. Their analyses intersect without being interchangeable. (R01; R05; R12)

## 8. Love and relationship

Interpersonal relationships form one important axis of resonance, alongside relations with activities and material things, and existential relations through such domains as nature, art, or religion. Love cannot be reduced to pleasant emotional connection: a relationship can be demanding, disturbing, and transformative while retaining mutual responsiveness. Conversely, enthusiasm and togetherness do not establish resonance if the other's difference is suppressed. Scholarly objections about exclusionary collectives show that identifying reciprocal response does not automatically settle a relationship's moral status. (R03; R05; R08; R10)

## 9. Suffering

Pain and dissonance do not automatically exclude resonance, but neither suffering nor uncontrollability guarantees it. A catastrophe can render the world inaccessible or hostile. It would be inappropriate to turn the theory into an instruction to appreciate distress or a claim that adversity necessarily deepens life. Rosa's concern is whether responsive relations remain possible and what

social conditions support them. This leaves room for resistance to harmful conditions without pretending that eliminating every disturbance would produce the good life. (R05; R06; R10)

## 10. Change

Resonance involves transformation rather than the execution of an entirely predesigned outcome. Stable relationships and practices can provide enduring opportunities for such encounters without guaranteeing that they occur. This creates a productive difficulty: how can cultivated routine support an event that cannot be manufactured? Sigurðsson and D'Ambrosio press that question by challenging an overly exceptional or episodic reading. Rosa's own distinction between enduring axes and particular experiences partly answers it, without making the disagreement disappear. (R05; R06; R11)

## 11. Control

Humans need knowledge, material security, practical competence, and institutions; relinquishing all control would not be emancipation. But securing access, measuring success, and controlling an outcome cannot guarantee resonance. If the other's response were entirely commanded, its independent voice and transformative potential would be lost. **Uncontrollability is necessary, not sufficient:** arbitrary danger is uncontrollable too. Appropriate control can establish conditions of encounter while remaining unable to predetermine the encounter itself. (R04; R05; R06; R09)

## 12. Alienation

Alienation is a deficient relationship in which the world fails to speak meaningfully to the subject, and the subject's response does not establish a living connection. It can appear as indifference or hostility despite abundant access and activity. Rosa does not require permanent resonance or condemn every instrumental relation: some distance and objectification are indispensable. Cheng's criticism is nevertheless useful against an overly exhaustive resonance/alienation

binary, especially concerning ordinary relations with things. The theory must not classify every neutral or functional moment as a failed life. (R04; R05; R09; R12)

### 13. The good life

A good life has possibilities for sustained, responsive world-relations; it cannot be measured solely by accumulated resources, choices, achievements, or reported happiness. Its social conditions matter as much as personal orientation. Slower speed can sometimes help, but slowness is neither sufficient nor always desirable. Resonance offers a powerful evaluative perspective; whether it can itself ground all moral and political distinctions remains unresolved. The selected critics and Rosa's reply should travel together into any later dialogue. (R02; R06; R07; R08; R10)

**Qualification that must survive into the monograph.** Resonance requires being affected, answering with one's own voice, transformation, and an outcome that cannot be guaranteed. It is a mode of relation, not a prescribed mood, a relaxation technique, or a permanent condition. Rosa's theory concerns the organization of social life as well as personal experience. (R03; R05; R06)

## Part VI — The Eight Human Tensions

The following tensions arise from the independent files. They are problems within a life, not a list of schools disagreeing. The poles are competing demands or dimensions, not logical opposites that require choosing one side permanently.

Freedom, agency, effort, and constraint are combined in T1 because they otherwise repeat the question of effective initiative under conditions. Responsibility receives T2 because being able to act and being legitimately blameworthy are different matters. Authenticity and social influence become T3; uncertainty and contingency about meaning become T4. Autonomy and dependence belong with relationship in T5. Individual-society is a dimension crossing all eight, not a ninth tension. “Surrender” is replaced by receptive openness in T8 because it misleadingly suggests resignation.

### T1 — Acting within a situation

**Initiative ↔ conditions of possibility.** Initiative means undertaking or refusing an action as one’s own. Conditions include bodily ability, knowledge, character, resources, institutions, and effective alternatives. The problem is neither whether conditions exist nor whether effort matters, but what effort can actually accomplish in this situation.

**Human situation:** A parent wants to leave an exploitative job but depends on its income and irregular schedule to keep the household functioning. The demand to act is real; the practical alternatives are unequal and costly. (F03; E09; B08; R01)

## T2 — Answerability without total authorship

### **Responsibility ↔ limits of authorship and culpability.**

Responsibility includes answering for conduct, acknowledging harm, and responding to others. Limited authorship means that motives, capacities, information, and circumstances were partly inherited or imposed. Explanation, excuse, repair, and blame must be distinguished rather than bundled together.

**Human situation:** An exhausted supervisor humiliates a colleague under pressure from management. Their exhaustion helps explain the act; it does not automatically determine whether they should apologize, be blamed, receive support, or challenge the workplace.

(F06; E04; B04; R10)

## T3 — Owning desires while being socially formed

### **Personal appropriation ↔ social production of wanting.**

Appropriation means being able to recognize and stand behind a desire or commitment. Social production concerns how rewards, roles, habits, and institutions shape what feels desirable. Sincerity does not by itself settle ownership or worth, and influence does not automatically invalidate a desire.

**Human situation:** Someone passionately pursues a prestigious career and later wonders whether they ever wanted its daily work, rather than the recognition attached to it. The desire was sincere; its authority is now in question. (F03; E01; E02; B03; R05)

## T4 — Commitment without guarantees

### **Binding significance ↔ contingency and uncertain justification.**

A commitment asks to matter beyond passing preference.

Contingency means that outcomes, circumstances, and sometimes one's understanding of what matters can change; uncertain justification means no complete assurance is available that this is the right commitment.

**Human situation:** A person commits years to caring for a place, a relationship, or a public cause without knowing whether the effort will succeed or continue to seem worthwhile. The issue is how commitment can be serious without certainty. (F03; E12; B02; R08)

## T5 — Relationship without self-erasure

**Singularity and autonomy ↔ dependence and reciprocity.**

Singularity means remaining someone with a voice and projects of one's own. Dependence concerns needing others and being affected by their lives; reciprocity concerns recognizing them as subjects rather than instruments. Relationship can sustain freedom or absorb it.

**Human situation:** An adult child caring for an ill parent must decide how to help without abandoning their own life or making the parent obey a preferred plan. Need creates obligations but does not confer unlimited authority. (F05; E04; B12; R04)

## T6 — Continuity through becoming

**Enduring identity and commitment ↔ transformation and revision.** Continuity concerns what allows a life, relationship, or promise to remain recognizably one's own over time. Transformation means becoming different enough that earlier desires and self-descriptions no longer suffice. Neither rigid sameness nor perpetual replacement settles the problem.

**Human situation:** After years in one profession, someone wants a different life but fears betraying the person they were and the people who relied on them. They must distinguish responsible revision from both self-imprisonment and convenient abandonment. (F02; E05; B06; R06)

## T7 — Changing suffering, meeting irreversibility

**Remedy and resistance ↔ acknowledgment of what cannot be undone.** Remedy concerns changing harmful conditions, treating pain, and resisting injustice. Acknowledgment concerns irreversible loss and limits that action cannot currently remove. The crucial boundary is contested: declaring suffering unavoidable too early can protect preventable harm.

**Human situation:** A family facing an irreversible death can still contest neglect, seek support, and change how care is provided. None of those actions restores the lost person. Meaning, justice, and consolation must not be treated as substitutes for one another. (F01; E03; B01; R10)

## T8 — Shaping life while allowing response

**Deliberate control ↔ receptive openness.** Control means organizing conditions and pursuing intended outcomes. Receptive openness means allowing another person, activity, or world to answer in a way not wholly predetermined by one's plan. It is not helplessness or acceptance of domination.

**Human situation:** Someone carefully plans time with a friend, then becomes frustrated when the conversation does not produce the expected closeness. Preparation may enable encounter; trying to command its result may undermine it. (F05; E04; B02; R05)

# Part VII — Four-Way Position Matrix

Each table reconstructs the strongest defensible contribution to the corresponding human problem. Differences in scope are explicit: Rosa does not supply a complete theory of blame, and Frankl does not supply a full theory of social character. The disagreement and complementarity statements are comparative inferences from the cited positions.

## T1 — Acting within a situation

| Thinker  | Most defensible position                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
|----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Frankl   | Conditions need not exhaust the person’s possible stance toward them. Meaningful action may involve changing the situation or answering an irreducible limit. His strong noetic claim exceeds a claim about demonstrable practical options and requires clinical qualification. (F03; F06; F11) |
| Fromm    | Initiative depends partly on character and on alternatives a person can recognize and enact. Freedom develops through productive activity and social conditions supporting it; invoking willpower cannot replace either. (E02; E08; E09)                                                        |
| Beauvoir | Projecting beyond the given and having concrete opportunities are distinguishable. Ethical freedom requires acting within a situation while seeking possibilities for others; oppression can radically diminish the opportunities presupposed by moral exhortation. (B01; B03; B08)             |
| Rosa     | Ask how institutions organize the person’s relation to work and time. An individual can make decisions while remaining compelled to accelerate merely to maintain their position; more choices need not mean a better world-relation. (R01; R02; R05)                                           |

**Genuine disagreement:** Frankl’s irreducible spiritual freedom does not amount to Fromm’s historically developed capacity for effective choice. Beauvoir’s ontological freedom is not simply identical to either, while Rosa questions the sufficiency of choice-centered evaluation itself.

**Complementarity:** One can distinguish the ethical importance of addressing a person as someone who can answer, the conditions enabling action, and the institutional organization of available activities. Those levels can illuminate the same predicament without proving Frankl’s strongest universal claim.

## T2 — Answerability without total authorship

| Thinker  | Most defensible position                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
|----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Frankl   | Treating someone as answerable can honor their personhood, but responsibility for a response must not be confused with responsibility for all conditions. His resistance to exculpatory determinism leaves difficult impairment cases insufficiently specified. (F03; F06; F12)           |
| Fromm    | Character formation qualifies the attribution of choice. Moreover, evaluating destructiveness need not mean assuming an authority entitled to condemn the person: understanding its causes can coexist with a severe judgment about unrealized human powers. (E02, pp. 231–237; E04; E09) |
| Beauvoir | Judge acts and their effects without reducing the whole person to the act. Circumstances can mitigate responsibility, but uncertainty and social explanation do not eliminate the need to judge serious wrongdoing. (B04; B05; B09)                                                       |
| Rosa     | Examine whether blame individualizes a difficulty produced by institutions. This is a criticism of the framing of responsibility, not a complete rule specifying when an individual should be excused. (R02; R10; R12)                                                                    |

**Genuine disagreement:** Frankl gives the affirmation of responsibility and guilt a dignity-protecting role; Fromm separates humanistic evaluation from an authority to condemn. Beauvoir retains a hard problem of justified punishment that neither causal understanding nor resonance settles. These are different conceptions of judgment, not just different degrees of leniency.

**Complementarity:** Explaining formation, assigning culpability, making repair, and altering conditions are distinct tasks. A person might owe acknowledgment and repair even when the degree of blame is mitigated; that is a comparative distinction, not a shared doctrine established by all four.

### T3 — Owning desires while being socially formed

| Thinker  | Most defensible position                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
|----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Frankl   | The decisive question is whether a desire responds to genuine meaning rather than conformity or self-preoccupation. Explaining its causes cannot by itself establish or refute the worth of what is intended; conscience remains fallible. (F03; F05; F08) |
| Fromm    | Sincere wanting can enact social requirements. Evaluate the character orientation and exercise of human powers involved, rather than treating felt authenticity or market success as sufficient validation. (E01; E02; E07)                                |
| Beauvoir | Desires develop in situations structured by recognition and hierarchy. Assuming a project requires confronting its conditions and relation to others' freedom; merely declaring it one's choice does not legitimate oppression. (B01; B03; B11)            |
| Rosa     | Ask whether the pursuit treats the world primarily as something to acquire and command, or sustains a responsive, transformative relation. This does not establish that every acquired or socially rewarded desire is alienated. (R04; R05; R12)           |

**Genuine disagreement:** Their critical standards differ: discovered meaning, productive human powers, ethically assumed freedom, and the quality of world-relations. None is a neutral translation of the others.

**Complementarity:** Causal origin and normative validity are different questions. Fromm can expose the social production of an aspiration without thereby refuting Frankl's insistence that what the aspiration is directed toward also needs examination.

## T4 — Commitment without guarantees

| Thinker         | Most defensible position                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
|-----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Frankl</b>   | A situation can contain a real meaning even when fulfillment is uncertain. Conscience must discern it without becoming infallible; ignorance of ultimate meaning need not prevent concrete responsibility. (F03; F09; F10)    |
| <b>Fromm</b>    | Productive commitment rests on humanistic judgment and active hope, not guaranteed historical progress. The future is open, but not every possible future equally supports human growth. (E02; E06; E12)                      |
| <b>Beauvoir</b> | No completed order of value guarantees projects from outside human existence. Commitment creates and sustains significance while remaining answerable to the freedom of others and to uncertain consequences. (B01; B02; B06) |
| <b>Rosa</b>     | One can cultivate an enduring axis of relationship without securing a resonant event or its outcome. A responsive encounter may also unsettle the values with which one entered it. (R05; R06; R07)                           |

**Genuine disagreement:** Frankl's objective, discoverable situational meaning conflicts with Beauvoir's refusal of externally guaranteed value. Fromm's substantive human ideal supplies a different foundation again; resonance does not by itself settle that dispute.

**Complementarity:** All four make space for commitment without prediction of success. Agreement on the inadequacy of guarantees does not imply agreement on where a commitment’s authority originates.

T5 — Relationship without self-erasure

| Thinker  | Most defensible position                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
|----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Frankl   | Love and devotion disclose meaning beyond the self. The beloved is singular rather than a means of satisfying a drive; self-transcendence does not authorize prescribing their life’s task. (F01; F03; F05)                            |
| Fromm    | Mature love joins people while preserving integrity. Care and responsibility need respect and knowledge, otherwise concern can become domination or dependence on being needed. (E04; E08)                                             |
| Beauvoir | Help must appeal to another freedom rather than replace it. Devotion is ethically ambiguous when the caregiver’s project eclipses the recipient’s or when one person’s supposed vocation is perpetual self-effacement. (B02; B03; B12) |
| Rosa     | Responsive relationship needs distinct voices and openness to transformation. Neither isolated sovereignty nor fusion describes it, and being affected can be part of freedom rather than simply its opposite. (R04; R06; R07)         |

**Genuine disagreement:** Frankl’s task-centered self-transcendence, Fromm’s mature loving character, Beauvoir’s reciprocal freedom, and Rosa’s transformed world-relation locate the norm differently. Beauvoir can ask whose freedom a seemingly noble devotion actually advances.

**Complementarity:** The four help distinguish attention beyond oneself, a cultivated capacity to love, ethical limits on acting for others, and the lived quality of mutual response. Each can reveal a failure the others do not fully describe.

## T6 — Continuity through becoming

| Thinker         | Most defensible position                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Frankl</b>   | Changing tasks need not erase fulfilled meanings. Actualized possibilities belong irreversibly to the past; the life already lived retains reality even when capacities or circumstances change. (F02; F04)                  |
| <b>Fromm</b>    | Character can change through awareness, practice, and supporting social conditions. Development is assessed through human powers rather than fidelity to every earlier preference or marketable identity. (E02; E05; E08)    |
| <b>Beauvoir</b> | No identity settles future conduct. Renewed projects must assume a real past without treating it as destiny; transformation does not recover everything lost or exempt one from obligations already created. (B01; B04; B06) |
| <b>Rosa</b>     | A responsive encounter can transform subject and world-relation. Enduring axes provide continuity, but the transformed person cannot fully specify in advance who they will become. (R05; R06; R11)                          |

**Genuine disagreement:** Frankl’s preservation of realized possibilities has a consoling metaphysical force absent from Beauvoir’s insistence on unrecovered loss. Fromm gives change a relatively substantive direction of maturity; Rosa leaves the content of resonant transformation less predetermined.

**Complementarity:** Continuity of obligations, accumulated character, enduring relationships, and the worth of past action are distinct kinds of continuity. They can coexist without implying an immutable inner self.

## T7 — Changing suffering, meeting irreversibility

| Thinker         | Most defensible position                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Frankl</b>   | Remove avoidable causes of suffering. Where suffering is unavoidable, a meaningful response may remain, but this neither makes the injury necessary nor proves the sufferer can produce a chosen attitude on demand. (F01; F03; F11)                       |
| <b>Fromm</b>    | Investigate socially produced distress and the misleading normality that conceals it. Tragic limits remain, but inward adjustment must not replace changes in the conditions damaging human life. (E03; E05; E10)                                          |
| <b>Beauvoir</b> | Resist oppression and refuse to justify victims' suffering by a supposedly higher total good. Irreversibility cannot be cancelled, and ethically necessary action can still leave losses for which no complete reconciliation exists. (B01; B04; B05)      |
| <b>Rosa</b>     | Alienating conditions can be changed, while pain and uncertainty cannot simply be engineered away. Uncontrollable suffering is not thereby resonant; responsive relations can be supported without requiring sufferers to experience them. (R05; R06; R10) |

**Genuine disagreement:** Frankl's confidence that meaning remains possible, and his elevation of some responses to suffering, face Beauvoir's resistance to redemptive totalization and Fromm's suspicion of adaptive moral demands. The disagreement is strongest when another person declares a limit unavoidable.

**Complementarity:** Preventing injury, judging injustice, accompanying someone, and asking whether they find meaning address different questions. A personally meaningful response can coexist with a judgment that the suffering should never have occurred.

## T8 — Shaping life while allowing response

| Thinker         | Most defensible position                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
|-----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Frankl</b>   | Direct attention toward a meaningful person or task rather than commanding fulfillment itself. Control should address remediable causes; self-transcendence is not guaranteed by monitoring one's own achievement of it. (F01; F05; F07)        |
| <b>Fromm</b>    | Cultivate capacities through discipline while relinquishing possessive control of the beloved and the world. Material provision matters; the having orientation becomes problematic when possession substitutes for living activity. (E04; E05) |
| <b>Beauvoir</b> | Act on situations and make appeals, but accept that another freedom cannot be authored from outside. Uncertainty does not excuse inaction or make the means used to secure a result ethically irrelevant. (B02; B05; B12)                       |
| <b>Rosa</b>     | Organize conditions for encounter without claiming to manufacture resonance. Its responsive otherness and transformative outcome must remain partly unavailable to command; unpredictability alone supplies no good. (R04; R05; R06; R09)       |

**Genuine disagreement:** The excess over control has different status: a meaningful object beyond the self, the integrity of living persons, irreducible freedom and ambiguity, or the structure of resonance. Rosa's uncontrollability should not assimilate all four into one principle.

**Complementarity:** Preparation and receptivity need not conflict. The disagreement concerns what a good encounter is and why its outcome cannot legitimately or successfully be commanded.

## Part VIII — Where They Actually Disagree

### The source of normative authority

Frankl treats meaning as something to be discovered, not invented at will. Beauvoir denies that an independently completed order can guarantee human projects; ethical significance requires the assumption of freedom and its relation to other freedoms. Fromm grounds evaluation in a substantive account of human flourishing. Rosa evaluates modes of world-relation while facing objections that his moral distinctions depend on values resonance does not itself establish. These are competing accounts of justification, not four vocabularies for an agreed answer. (F03; F08; E02; E11; B01; B10; R08; R10)

### How far conditioning reaches

Frankl explicitly criticizes a drive-based formulation attributed to Fromm in *The Philosophical Foundations of Logotherapy*. The dispute concerns whether striving toward meaning is understood in its intentional significance or explained as the effect of forces behind it. Fromm's own selected texts prevent reducing his position to a crude mechanism: he defends active powers, while later formulations reconstructed by Funk also distinguish real alternatives. Nevertheless, *Man for Himself* makes character determine decision and separates evaluation from condemnatory judgment. Frankl's association of guilt with dignity is therefore challenged at the level of moral judgment itself. The historical criticism is Frankl's; the qualified comparison is this dossier's reconstruction. (F03; F06; E01; E02, pp. 231–237; E09)

## Whether freedom can be protected by separating it from circumstance

Beauvoir's developing attention to oppression and embodiment challenges an account that protects freedom principally by locating it beyond conditions. This objection also bears on her own early formulations: Bergoffen and Kruks identify an interior/exterior separation and an abstract emphasis on freedom that later work complicates. It would therefore be false to cast Beauvoir as consistently situated from the outset, or to declare that her position simply refutes every noetic claim. The unresolved question is what remains of an ethical appeal when effective possibilities are severely restricted. (F04; F11; B03; B08; B09; B10; B11)

## Meaning in suffering and the irreversibility of loss

Frankl's strongest account says fulfilled possibilities are preserved and meaning can remain possible to the end. Beauvoir refuses to let future benefit or a completed historical whole redeem particular losses. Frankl does not say perpetrators are justified or suffering must be sought, so those accusations would miss him. The real dispute concerns whether loss can be placed within an ultimately meaning-bearing account, and whether that confidence risks obscuring what remains unreconciled for the person who suffered. Fromm adds pressure to investigate who benefits when avoidable distress is redescribed as an inward challenge. (F01; F02; F03; E03; E05; B01; B05)

## A substantive human ideal versus openness to becoming

Fromm's productive orientation supplies a positive account of maturity and human powers. Beauvoir resists a settled essence that would predetermine the human project, although she certainly does not make every project ethically equivalent. Rosa treats transformation through relation as integral to the good life, while critics ask whether its direction is sufficiently specified. Fromm can

offer evaluative content where Rosa seems open-ended; Rosa can ask whether a predetermined ideal permits enough transformation. The alternatives cannot be harmonized by calling all of them growth. (E02; E06; E10; B01; B06; R06; R08)

## **Choosing well versus relating differently**

Frankl's question concerns the meaning to which one should answer; Beauvoir's concerns the ethical assumption of situated projects; Fromm's concerns productive human activity and social character. Rosa changes the center of attention to the mode in which self and world encounter one another. A person might choose a defensible task, possess formally protected autonomy, and still inhabit an unresponsive world. Conversely, an intense encounter does not by itself vindicate a project morally. The priority of responsive relation and its dependence on independent ethical criteria remain unsettled. (F03; E03; B05; R04; R07; R08; R10)

## Part IX — Where Apparently Opposed Ideas Become Complementary

**An explanation of desire is not yet an evaluation of its object.**

Fromm can explain why prestige is sincerely wanted; Frankl can ask whether the activity toward which the person is directed contains a defensible meaning. Beauvoir adds scrutiny of the project's relation to others' freedom; Rosa asks how pursuing it organizes the person's world-relation. This division of questions is useful, but does not resolve their competing standards of worth. (F03; E01; E07; B03; R05)

**Addressing a person as responsible differs from measuring their available options.**

Frankl's refusal to reduce a person to a diagnosis can protect dignity. Fromm's character analysis and Beauvoir's concrete freedom help prevent that address from becoming an unsupported verdict that a particular response was available. Rosa adds scrutiny of institutional demands. These contributions are complementary only while the universal attribution of dignity is kept distinct from the factual and moral judgment of culpability. (F04; F11; E09; B08; R10)

**Personal response and social remedy operate at different levels.**

Someone can seek meaning in a present predicament while collective action changes its causes. Frankl explicitly recognizes changing avoidable causes, and Fromm explicitly requires personal as well as institutional transformation. The opposition between inward response and social criticism is therefore sometimes overstated. It becomes real again when inward adaptation is used to postpone remedy or social causation is used to deny every remaining initiative. (F01; F03; E03; E08)

**Love requires both capacities and limits.** Fromm clarifies the cultivated abilities involved in loving; Beauvoir clarifies why acting for another cannot replace their freedom. Frankl adds the encounter with singularity, and Rosa adds receptivity to an answer one did not design. These contributions concern different aspects of relationship, without implying agreement on a final theory of love. (E04; B12; F05; R04)

**Institutions can enable what they cannot guarantee.** Stable time, material provision, and protection from domination can support meaningful activity and responsive relationships. They cannot guarantee the right judgment, reciprocal love, or resonance. This distinguishes providing conditions from promising an outcome; it does not prove that every thinker understands the outcome in the same way. (F03; E03; B03; R02; R05)

**Rejecting direct happiness-maximization does not establish a common ideal.** Frankl's meaningful responsibility, Fromm's productive life, Beauvoir's ethical freedom, and Rosa's resonance all exceed reported pleasure. Their shared refusal of a thin criterion makes comparison possible. The positive alternatives remain different, sometimes incompatible, standards. (F01; E02; B03; R07)

# Part X — The Twenty-First-Century Test

These are **conceptual tests using hypothetical contemporary situations**. They add no references and make no empirical claims about prevalence, diagnoses, or platform effects. Each tension has exactly two manifestations.

| Tension                                            | Manifestation 1                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | Manifestation 2                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
|----------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>T1 · Acting within a situation</b>              | <b>Economic insecurity:</b> A worker is told to choose meaningful work while unable to risk missing rent. Frankl’s acknowledgment of material conditions must remain alongside his appeal to meaning; Fromm and Beauvoir sharpen the inquiry into effective alternatives. | <b>Constant availability:</b> A worker can technically mute notifications but expects a penalty for doing so. Rosa distinguishes an individual setting from institutional rhythms; choosing a boundary does not establish the social freedom to sustain it. |
| <b>T2 · Answerability without total authorship</b> | <b>Productivity culture:</b> An employer treats exhaustion and missed targets entirely as failures of personal discipline. The four-way test asks separately about conduct, realistic alternatives, management’s demands, and needed repair.                              | <b>Mental-health language:</b> Someone uses an explanatory label to claim that no apology for a hurtful act is owed. Explanation, culpability, and responsibility to repair require distinct judgments; the dossier does not supply a clinical verdict.     |

| Tension                                       | Manifestation 1                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | Manifestation 2                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
|-----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>T3 · Owning socially formed desires</b>    | <b>Personal branding:</b> A person experiences continual audience approval as proof that their public persona is authentic. Fromm questions whether sincere self-presentation has become marketing oneself; Beauvoir asks what concrete projects and dependencies it conceals. | <b>Algorithmic attention:</b> A person wonders whether a repeated recommendation helped produce an aspiration they now feel strongly. Social origin does not settle its value; Frankl's question about meaning and Rosa's about the resulting relation remain open.                    |
| <b>T4 · Commitment without guarantees</b>     | <b>Uncertainty about the future:</b> Someone hesitates to make any long commitment without assurance that conditions will remain stable. Each position permits serious action under uncertainty, while giving a different account of what makes commitment justified.          | <b>Choice overload:</b> A person keeps every professional option open and repeatedly postpones engagement. Beauvoir challenges the fantasy of avoiding responsibility; Fromm distinguishes living activity from indefinite preparation, without proving which option should be chosen. |
| <b>T5 · Relationship without self-erasure</b> | <b>Digital intimacy:</b> Partners use permanent location access as proof of care. Fromm's respect and Beauvoir's reciprocity expose the difference between concern and possession; Rosa asks whether technical access actually supports mutual response.                       | <b>Loneliness:</b> A person seeks frictionless companionship that never challenges them. Frankl's encounter with singularity and Rosa's distinction between response and echo test whether removing every disturbance also removes another's independent voice.                        |

| Tension                                                 | Manifestation 1                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Manifestation 2                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
|---------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>T6 · Continuity through becoming</b>                 | <b>Pressure to reinvent oneself:</b> A worker feels compelled to replace their identity whenever a market trend changes. Fromm distinguishes development from becoming saleable; Rosa situates perpetual adaptation within social demands for continued movement. | <b>Work becoming identity:</b> Someone leaving a profession interprets the change as proof that all earlier years were wasted. Frankl protects the reality of fulfilled possibilities; Beauvoir permits revision without promising that every loss is recovered.       |
| <b>T7 · Changing suffering, meeting irreversibility</b> | <b>Compulsory growth narratives:</b> A bereaved person feels required to describe loss as a gift. Frankl's permission to seek meaning must not become a demand imposed by others; Beauvoir blocks the inference that subsequent growth justifies the loss.        | <b>Economic hardship as a mindset problem:</b> Someone is urged to appreciate hardship while remediable working conditions are ignored. Fromm's social criticism and Frankl's own distinction between avoidable and unavoidable suffering jointly challenge that move. |
| <b>T8 · Shaping life while allowing response</b>        | <b>Self-optimization:</b> A person measures every activity and becomes frustrated when a well-designed routine fails to produce fulfillment. Frankl and Rosa both question direct manufacture of the desired experience, for different reasons.                   | <b>Engineered closeness:</b> Partners follow a strict plan intended to guarantee intimacy. Fromm allows disciplined cultivation, Beauvoir protects the other's freedom, and Rosa explains why preparation cannot command a responsive encounter.                       |

**Result of the test:** The tensions remain recognizable without attributing digital theories to the original authors. The contemporary scenarios reveal the usefulness and limits of the reconstructions; they do not independently validate the philosophies.

# Part XI — What Each Thinker Brings to the Table

The following contributions prepare a plausible future conversation. Each is a reconstruction of a distinctive question or objection, not fictional speech or a quotation.

## T1 — Acting within a situation

### What each person would bring to the table

**Frankl.** He would insist that a description of conditions should not automatically be treated as a complete description of the person. His distinctive challenge is to identify an actual meaningful response while avoiding the unjustified inference that everyone can exercise it equally or immediately. (F03; F06; F11)

**Fromm.** He would ask how this person's character and social circumstances have shaped the alternatives they can genuinely perceive and pursue. He would challenge an appeal to initiative that ignores the development of the powers needed to act. (E01; E02; E09)

**Beauvoir.** She would distinguish the structure of projecting from the concrete freedom to carry a project forward. Her question would concern both what this person can undertake and what others must change to make that undertaking possible. (B01; B03; B08)

**Rosa.** He would ask why maintaining an ordinary life requires so much continuous movement. He would shift attention toward the institutional rhythms through which apparently personal decisions become recurrent demands to keep up. (R01; R02; R05)

## T2 — Answerability without total authorship

### What each person would bring to the table

**Frankl.** He would challenge forms of explanation that deprive a person of any standing as an answerable subject. He would also need to defend the boundary between that respect and a blame-imposing assumption that a different response was possible. (F03; F06; F12)

**Fromm.** He would distinguish an evaluation of destructive conduct or character from the claim to stand above someone with authority to condemn them. His account would then face the question of how a severe judgment about unrealized human powers differs ethically from the blame it seeks to displace. (E02; E04; E09)

**Beauvoir.** She would insist that the act, its circumstances, its victims, and the offender's remaining future all matter. Her resistance to reducing a person to a deed would coexist with a willingness to make difficult judgments rather than replacing justice with automatic absolution. (B04; B05)

**Rosa.** He would ask whether a blame-centered description makes an institutionally produced predicament appear entirely private. He would contribute that diagnostic shift while leaving the precise assessment of individual culpability unfinished. (R02; R10; R12)

## T3 — Owning desires while being socially formed

### What each person would bring to the table

**Frankl.** He would ask what the aspiration is directed toward and whether it answers a meaningful demand beyond self-confirmation. His objection would be that an account of the desire's causes has not yet evaluated the significance of its object. (F03; F05)

**Fromm.** He would bring the clearest explanation of how a socially required desire can be wholeheartedly experienced as personal. He would ask whether its pursuit expresses living powers or trains the person to value themselves primarily through demand and approval. (E01; E02; E07)

**Beauvoir.** She would ask which social position made this desire appear natural and which possibilities were obscured. She would also examine whether assuming the project enlarges freedom or reproduces a relation of domination. (B03; B06; B11)

**Rosa.** He would ask what relationship to the world the aspiration establishes in practice. He would distinguish accumulation of reach and resources from encounters in which the person can be addressed and transformed. (R04; R05)

## T4 — Commitment without guarantees

### What each person would bring to the table

**Frankl.** He would defend the possibility that a task matters even when success is uncertain and the whole of life is not comprehensible. He would have to explain how fallible conscience can discern objective meaning without converting personal conviction into unquestionable authority. (F03; F08; F10)

**Fromm.** He would distinguish active hope from waiting for inevitable progress or rescue. He would offer a humanistic standard for assessing the future being pursued, while remaining answerable for the justification of that standard. (E02; E06; E12)

**Beauvoir.** She would challenge the wish for a final guarantee that relieves commitment of ambiguity. Her contribution would be the demand to sustain finite projects in relation to other freedoms without pretending to stand outside history and judge from nowhere. (B01; B02; B06)

**Rosa.** He would distinguish sustaining a relationship from guaranteeing what it will yield. His question would be whether the commitment permits the world to answer differently from what the person already expects or wants. (R05; R06; R07)

## T5 — Relationship without self-erasure

### What each person would bring to the table

**Frankl.** He would emphasize that another person's singularity can address us beyond our concern with ourselves. He would need to distinguish such devotion from deciding that the beloved must fulfill the possibilities we attribute to them. (F01; F03; F05)

**Fromm.** He would ask whether care includes respect and knowledge or depends on possession and the need to be indispensable. His distinctive contribution would be love as a cultivated capacity that preserves individuality within union. (E04; E08)

**Beauvoir.** She would examine whether acting for another person actually makes room for their freedom. Her objection would target devotion that quietly converts the other's life into the giver's project or makes one person's sacrifice the permanent condition of another's independence. (B02; B03; B12)

**Rosa.** He would ask whether the relationship contains two responsive voices rather than one voice and an echo. He would defend the value of being affected while distinguishing it from absorption, coercion, or the elimination of difference. (R04; R06; R08)

## T6 — Continuity through becoming

### What each person would bring to the table

**Frankl.** He would insist that the worth of what has been lived need not disappear when a task or capacity ends. His claim that realized possibilities are preserved would introduce a strong account of continuity whose metaphysical status must remain open to challenge. (F02; F08)

**Fromm.** He would distinguish transformation of character from endlessly adjusting a marketable identity. He would ask whether the change develops powers of reason and love, and whether new practice and social conditions can sustain it. (E02; E05; E08)

**Beauvoir.** She would challenge both the claim that the past fixes the future and the fantasy that one can begin again without remainder. Her contribution would be renewed commitment that acknowledges earlier obligations and irrecoverable losses without treating a settled identity as an excuse. (B01; B04; B06)

**Rosa.** He would ask whether continuity allows genuinely transformative encounters or merely protects an existing self-image. He would also press the importance of durable relationships and practices that permit change without requiring permanent instability. (R05; R06; R11)

## **T7 — Changing suffering, meeting irreversibility**

### **What each person would bring to the table**

**Frankl.** He would first distinguish a condition to change from a loss that cannot be undone. He would then defend the possibility of meaningful response while facing the objection that this possibility must not become a heroic duty imposed on someone already suffering. (F01; F03; F11)

**Fromm.** He would investigate whether apparently inevitable distress is maintained by social arrangements or concealed by ordinary expectations. He would resist both passive adjustment to those conditions and the fantasy that better institutions could eliminate every tragic limit. (E03; E05; E06)

**Beauvoir.** She would insist that a later benefit does not erase the injured person's loss. Her contribution would preserve resistance and judgment without promising that history, reconciliation, or a meaningful narrative can make everything right. (B01; B04; B05)

**Rosa.** He would ask what forms of responsive relation remain possible and what support they require. He would reject the inference that pain becomes good because it is uncontrollable, or that suffering people owe anyone an experience of resonance. (R05; R06; R10)

## T8 — Shaping life while allowing response

### What each person would bring to the table

**Frankl.** He would distinguish pursuing a meaningful task from monitoring whether it is producing personal fulfillment. His contribution would show how intense control of one's desired experience can obstruct attention to what lies beyond the self. (F05; F07)

**Fromm.** He would defend disciplined cultivation while questioning the attempt to possess living experience. His question would be whether practical mastery serves the exercise of human powers or substitutes ownership for participation. (E04; E05)

**Beauvoir.** She would distinguish acting effectively on a situation from determining another person's free response. She would resist using uncertainty either to justify domination or to evade the responsibility to act. (B02; B05; B12)

**Rosa.** He would make the clearest structural distinction between arranging conditions and manufacturing resonance. His challenge would be to permit an answer capable of changing the participants while retaining protections against coercion and arbitrary harm. (R04; R06; R09)

## Part XII — Potential Flow Hijacked Synthesis Points

**Flags only.** These identify places for a later investigation; they assert no correspondence with Flow Hijacked and propose no synthesis.

- **Potential synthesis point — T1:** The distinction among dignity, effective possibilities, and institutions that enable action. (F11; E09; B08; R02)
- **Potential synthesis point — T2:** The separation of causal explanation, culpability, acknowledgment, and repair. (F06; E04; B04; R10)
- **Potential synthesis point — T3:** The difference between sincerity, the social formation of desire, and the evaluation of what is desired. (F03; E01; B03; R05)
- **Potential synthesis point — T4:** Serious commitment without a guarantee of success or final certainty. (F03; E12; B02; R06)
- **Potential synthesis point — T5:** Relationship that sustains singularity while making dependence explicit. (F05; E04; B12; R04)
- **Potential synthesis point — T6:** Distinct forms of continuity through changes in projects, character, and relationships. (F02; E05; B06; R11)
- **Potential synthesis point — T7:** The boundary between changing harmful conditions and responding to irreversible loss. (F01; E03; B01; R10)
- **Potential synthesis point — T8:** Preparing conditions for an encounter whose outcome cannot be commanded. (F05; E04; B02; R06)

## Part XIII — Potential Contradictions with Flow Hijacked

**Conditional flags only.** Flow Hijacked's position has not been reconstructed in this research phase. These are tests for the later account, not claims that it presently holds the positions described.

- **Potential contradiction with Flow Hijacked — Frankl's noetic freedom:** Any later account that explains persons exhaustively through their conditions would face his explicit anti-reductionism. (F04; F06; F08)
- **Potential contradiction with Flow Hijacked — Objective meaning:** Any later account that treats meaning as entirely constructed or equivalent to felt satisfaction would conflict with Frankl's demand for discovery and face his distinction between preference and meaning. (F03; F09)
- **Potential contradiction with Flow Hijacked — Fromm's normative humanism:** Any later account that evaluates life only through successful adaptation or individual preference would need to confront his substantive account of human powers and social pathology. (E02; E03; E06; E10)
- **Potential contradiction with Flow Hijacked — Beauvoir's ambiguity:** Any later account promising a complete resolution of freedom and facticity, or a final guarantee for action, would conflict with her account of the human condition. (B01; B06; B08)
- **Potential contradiction with Flow Hijacked — Oppression and judgment:** Any later account that makes social formation automatically exculpatory, or inner adjustment sufficient for liberation, would encounter Beauvoir's distinctions among circumstance, concrete freedom, and responsibility. (B03; B04; B11)

- **Potential contradiction with Flow Hijacked — Rosa's uncontrollability:** Any later account promising a reliable technique for producing resonance would undermine a defining feature of the concept. (R05; R06)
- **Potential contradiction with Flow Hijacked — Ethical sufficiency:** Any later account treating a meaningful or resonant experience as sufficient proof of moral rightness would bypass the unresolved problems raised by Beauvoir and Rosa's critics. (B05; R08; R10)
- **Potential contradiction with Flow Hijacked — Irrecoverable loss:** Any later account treating every loss as ultimately compensated by growth would confront Beauvoir's resistance to total justification and overstate even Frankl's qualified account of suffering. (B01; B05; F01)

## Part XIV — Evidence Ledger

### Counting and access conventions

This is the complete substantive bibliography: **48 references, with no supplementary reading list.** “Full text available; selected loci examined” means the source was consulted for the identified problem, not read exhaustively. “Bounded preview” marks a materially narrower examination. Distinct contributions in an edited volume are counted as works; the volume containing them is not counted again. Secondary scholarship is not promoted to primary evidence merely because it quotes an author.

### Viktor Frankl — six primary sources

#### F01 · Primary · Viktor Frankl

**Exact work:** Viktor E. Frankl, *Man’s Search for Meaning: An Introduction to Logotherapy*. Beacon Press, expanded fourth-edition text, 1992; original German work 1946. Part One translated by Ilse Lasch. [Consulted text](#).

**Examination:** Frankl’s narrative and the theoretical sections on meaning, love, suffering, transience, and tragic optimism; prefatory material by other authors is not evidence. **Why selected:** Establishes the indispensable distinction between avoidable and unavoidable suffering and the different routes to meaning. **Supports:** Meaning beyond generic purpose, love, existential vacuum, the limits of direct happiness-seeking, and removal of remediable suffering; T3–T5, T7–T8.

## F02 • Primary • Viktor Frankl

**Exact work:** Viktor E. Frankl, "Time and Responsibility," in *The Feeling of Meaninglessness: A Challenge to Psychotherapy and Philosophy*, edited by Alexander Batthyány. Marquette University Press, 2010, pp. 171–176. [Consulted collection](#).

**Examination:** Complete essay. **Why selected:** Adds the temporal and metaphysical argument that fulfilled possibilities are preserved, rather than repeating the general theory of meaning. **Supports:** Irreversibility, responsibility for actualization, continuity of a lived life, and the disagreement over unrecovered loss; T2, T4, T6–T7.

## F03 • Primary • Viktor Frankl

**Exact work:** Viktor E. Frankl, "The Philosophical Foundations of Logotherapy," originally 1964; reprinted in Batthyány, ed., *The Feeling of Meaninglessness*. Marquette University Press, 2010, pp. 107–120. [Consulted collection](#).

**Examination:** Essay's philosophical argument, including conscience, objective meaning, conditions, and the explicit objection to a formulation attributed to Fromm. **Why selected:** Gives the strongest direct account of normative foundations and their tensions.

**Supports:** Finite freedom, material prerequisites, fallible conscience, non-imposition of meaning, and the elevated valuation of unavoidable suffering; T1–T5, T7.

## F04 • Primary • Viktor Frankl

**Exact work:** Viktor E. Frankl, "Religion and Existential Psychotherapy," in Batthyány, ed., *The Feeling of Meaninglessness*. Marquette University Press, 2010, pp. 193–202. [Consulted collection](#).

**Examination:** Original essay text. **Why selected:** Clarifies spiritual personhood, the relation of psychotherapy to religion, and the irreducibility of persons with illness. **Supports:** Dignity,

psychophysical conditions, limits of a single therapeutic method, and the philosophical status of freedom; T1–T2, T6. Historical medical assertions are not adopted as current clinical evidence.

### F05 • Primary • Viktor Frankl

**Exact work:** Viktor E. Frankl, “Self-Transcendence as a Human Phenomenon.” *Journal of Humanistic Psychology* 6, no. 2 (1966): 97–106. [Consulted reproduction.](#)

**Examination:** Original article text, especially the analysis of motivation, self-actualization, and orientation toward tasks and persons. **Why selected:** Supplies the distinctive phenomenology of self-transcendence, rather than relying on a popular slogan about purpose. **Supports:** Agency, love, selfhood, the difference between meaningful orientation and a drive, and indirect fulfillment; T1, T3, T5–T6, T8.

### F06 • Primary • Viktor Frankl

**Exact work:** Viktor E. Frankl, “Determinism and Humanism,” originally *Humanitas* 7, no. 1 (1971): 23–36; reprinted in *The Feeling of Meaninglessness*. Marquette University Press, 2010, pp. 157–170. [Consulted collection.](#)

**Examination:** Complete essay. **Why selected:** Provides the strongest test of Frankl’s anti-reductionism and of the risk that a dignity-protecting appeal to responsibility becomes overextended. **Supports:** Noetic freedom, conditions versus exhaustive explanation, responsibility and guilt, and the limits of deterministic accounts; T1–T3. Its forceful formulations are not silently softened.

## Viktor Frankl — six secondary sources

### F07 · Secondary · Viktor Frankl

**Exact work:** Stefan E. Schulenberg, Robert R. Hutzell, Carrie Nassif, and Julius M. Rogina, “Logotherapy for Clinical Practice.” *Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, Practice, Training* 45, no. 4 (2008): 447–463. DOI: 10.1037/a0014331. [Article text](#).

**Examination:** Theoretical overview and sections on therapeutic roles, methods, and the research position of logotherapy. **Why selected:** Distinguishes a philosophical anthropology from concrete therapeutic practices and clinical claims. **Supports:** Self-distancing, remaining possibilities, therapeutic assistance, and the limits of treating efficacy as proof of metaphysics; T1–T2, T6, T8.

### F08 · Secondary · Viktor Frankl

**Exact work:** Claudia Reitingner, “Viktor Frankl’s Logotherapy From a Philosophical Point of View.” *Existential Analysis* 26, no. 2 (2015): 344–357. [Article text](#).

**Examination:** Philosophical reconstruction and assessment of the theory’s foundations. **Why selected:** Makes explicit the ontological and normative commitments that a purely therapeutic reading can obscure. **Supports:** The status of noetic freedom, discovered meaning, selfhood, and the distinction between philosophical argument and empirical demonstration; T1, T3–T4, T6.

### F09 · Secondary · Viktor Frankl

**Exact work:** Edith Weisskopf-Joelson, “Logotherapy: Science or Faith?” *Psychotherapy: Theory, Research & Practice* 12, no. 3 (1975): 238–240. DOI: 10.1037/h0086435. [Original first-page preview and abstract](#).

**Examination:** Bounded preview: original page 238 and abstract; pages 239–240 were not available for examination.

**Why selected:** Provides a distinct, sympathetic but critical formulation of logotherapy as a value-bearing worldview. **Supports:** The narrow claim that its assurance of meaning raises a faith/worldview question beyond scientific technique; T4. It is not used to establish the full article’s argument or to dismiss clinical evidence.

### F10 · Secondary · Viktor Frankl

**Exact work:** Joaquín García-Alandete, “The Place of Religiosity and Spirituality in Frankl’s Logotherapy: Distinguishing Salvific and Hygienic Objectives.” *Journal of Religion and Health* 63 (2024): 6–30; first published online 2023. [Full article](#).

**Examination:** Full article available; sections on the relation between therapy, spirituality, religion, and ultimate meaning examined. **Why selected:** Prevents both secular erasure of Frankl’s religious commitments and misrepresentation of logotherapy as compulsory religious conversion. **Supports:** Healing versus salvation, spiritual terminology, clinical meaning, and ultimate meaning; T1, T4, T7.

### F11 · Secondary · Viktor Frankl

**Exact work:** Alexander Batthyány, “Viktor E. Frankl & the Development of Logotherapy & Existential Analysis,” introduction to *The Feeling of Meaninglessness*. Marquette University Press, 2010, pp. 7–40; translated by David Hallowell, edited by Andrew Tallon. [Consulted introduction](#).

**Examination:** Developmental account and the clinically relevant distinctions concerning illness, treatment, and the person’s ability to participate. **Why selected:** Supplies qualifications to the universal rhetoric of freedom without pretending those qualifications eliminate every philosophical tension. **Supports:** Dignity versus manifest capacity, limits of exhortation, and the continuing place of medical and psychological care; T1–T2, T7–T8.

## F12 · Secondary · Viktor Frankl

**Exact work:** Timothy E. Pytell, “Frankl in America: Transcending the Angel Beast,” chapter 9 of Viktor Frankl’s *Search for Meaning: An Emblematic 20th-Century Life*. Berghahn Books, 2015, pp. 158–181.

[Consulted chapter in book text.](#)

**Examination:** The chapter’s critique of philosophical anthropology, therapeutic authority, and American reception. **Why selected:** A substantive critical interpretation, not a biography used for background padding. **Supports:** Risks of individualizing responsibility, normative authority, and the disputed success of Frankl’s account of human unity; T1–T2, T7. Speculative psychobiographical claims are not adopted.

## Erich Fromm — six primary sources

### E01 · Primary · Erich Fromm

**Exact work:** Erich Fromm, *Escape from Freedom*. Farrar & Rinehart, 1941; published in Britain as *The Fear of Freedom*, 1942.

[Examined appendix, “Character and Social Process”.](#)

**Examination:** The substantive appendix directly; claims about the book’s wider escape mechanisms are additionally grounded in E07 and E09. **Why selected:** The foundational argument linking social organization, character, and sincerely felt desire. **Supports:** Social character, adaptation, internalization, and the distinction between social origin and conscious deception; T1–T3. No claim of exhaustive examination of the book is made.

### E02 · Primary · Erich Fromm

**Exact work:** Erich Fromm, *Man for Himself: An Inquiry into the Psychology of Ethics*. Rinehart, 1947. [Digitized original.](#)

**Examination:** Sections on the human situation, marketing and productive orientations, humanistic conscience, and choice. **Why selected:** Provides the positive ethical anthropology without which Fromm becomes merely a critic of capitalism. **Supports:** Human powers, active agency, character, marketing oneself, and normative evaluation of desire; T1–T4, T6. Character orientations are ideal types, not a claim that actual persons fall into pure boxes.

### E03 • Primary • Erich Fromm

**Exact work:** Erich Fromm, *The Sane Society*. Rinehart, 1955. Digitized text.

**Examination:** The pathology of normalcy, alienation, and the argument for coordinated psychological, economic, political, and cultural change. **Why selected:** Connects personal estrangement to social arrangements while rejecting single-cause reform. **Supports:** Alienation despite successful adaptation, socially produced suffering, and reciprocal personal and institutional transformation; T1, T3, T6–T7. Its historical diagnoses are not current clinical findings.

### E04 • Primary • Erich Fromm

**Exact work:** Erich Fromm, *The Art of Loving*. Harper & Brothers, 1956. Consulted text.

**Examination:** The theory and practice of love, especially care, responsibility, respect, knowledge, integrity, and discipline. **Why selected:** Gives a precise account of love as active capacity rather than sentiment or object-selection. **Supports:** Reciprocity, responsibility without ownership, mature union, and cultivated practice; T2, T5, T8. Non-Fromm prefatory material is excluded, and dated gender assumptions are not universalized.

### E05 • Primary • Erich Fromm

**Exact work:** Erich Fromm, *To Have or To Be?* Harper & Row, 1976; consulted Continuum reprint, 2008. Consulted text.

**Examination:** Having and being, the distinction between necessary possession and characterological having, and conditions for human change. **Why selected:** Adds a developed account of lived orientation and the relation of insight to changed practice.

**Supports:** Possession, control, active meaning, material needs, and transformation; T3-T4, T6-T8.

### E06 · Primary · Erich Fromm

**Exact work:** Erich Fromm, “Human Nature and Social Theory,” letter to Vladimir Dobrenkov, 10 March 1969. [Letter text](#).

**Examination:** The argument concerning human needs, historical variation, and social explanation. **Why selected:** Clarifies that social formation does not imply an infinitely malleable person or eliminate normative human nature. **Supports:** Persistent needs, historically variable orientations, limits on social plasticity, and the foundations of productive life; T1, T3-T4, T6. It is identified as a letter, not a peer-reviewed article.

## Erich Fromm — six secondary sources

### E07 · Secondary · Erich Fromm

**Exact work:** Roger Foster, “Social Character: Erich Fromm and the Ideological Glue of Neoliberalism.” *Critical Horizons* 18, no. 1 (2017): 1–18. DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2017.1275166. [Article text](#).

**Examination:** The reconstruction of social character and its contemporary theoretical extension. **Why selected:** Explains the emotional internalization that makes socially organized wanting sincere. **Supports:** Freedom, conformity, marketing orientation, and the relation between individual and social character; T1, T3. Foster’s later application is not attributed to Fromm as a prediction.

### E08 · Secondary · Erich Fromm

**Exact work:** Kieran Durkin, “The Art of Living and the Dialectics of Social Transformation.” Fromm Forum, English edition, 23, special edition (2019): 24–32. [Article text](#).

**Examination:** The Fromm-focused argument concerning the relation between self-transformation and social transformation. **Why selected:** Prevents a false choice between individual ethics and collective change. **Supports:** Active practice, productive love, reciprocal individual and social development; T1–T2, T5–T6. Its comparison with another theorist is not developed into an additional research strand.

### E09 · Secondary · Erich Fromm

**Exact work:** Rainer Funk, Erich Fromm: The Courage to Be Human. Translated by Michael Shaw. Continuum, 1982; German original 1978. [Author-hosted text](#).

**Examination:** Sections on social character, character theory, humanistic ethics, and choice among alternatives. **Why selected:** A recognized specialist’s detailed account of the relationship between freedom and character, including severely diminished alternatives. **Supports:** Freedom from/to, escape, awareness, character development, and limits of culpability; T1–T3, T6. The Fromm-authored postscript is excluded from the evidence and reference count.

### E10 · Secondary · Erich Fromm

**Exact work:** Mauricio Cortina, “Beyond Freud’s Instinctivism and Fromm’s Existential Humanism,” in Mauricio Cortina and Michael Maccoby, eds., *A Prophetic Analyst: Erich Fromm’s Contribution to Psychoanalysis*. Jason Aronson, 1996, pp. 93–131. [Chapter text](#).

**Examination:** Fromm-focused analysis and criticism of the underlying anthropology. **Why selected:** Supplies a specialist challenge to treating Fromm's account of human needs and development as an unproblematic scientific foundation. **Supports:** The limits of a solely social explanation of distress and the contested basis of normative humanism; T1, T4, T7. Cortina's alternative framework is not retrofitted onto Fromm.

### E11 · Secondary · Erich Fromm

**Exact work:** Lawrence Wilde, Erich Fromm and the Quest for Solidarity. Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. [Book record](#); examined opening passages of [chapter 3, "Humanistic Ethics"](#), and [chapter 9, "Conclusion"](#).

**Examination:** Bounded previews of the author's chapter openings, beginning on pp. 37 and 145; not the whole chapters or book. **Why selected:** Adds the specific connection between normative humanism, solidarity, and criticism of adaptation. **Supports:** Only those narrow interpretive connections, corroborated by E02, E03, and E06; T3-T5, T7. Publisher promotional copy is not counted as scholarship.

### E12 · Secondary · Erich Fromm

**Exact work:** Joan Braune, Erich Fromm's Revolutionary Hope: Prophetic Messianism as a Critical Theory of the Future. Sense Publishers, 2014. [Book record](#); [examined original introduction in publisher front matter](#).

**Examination:** Author's introduction, pp. xiii-xxiv; the separately authored foreword is excluded. **Why selected:** Provides a focused interpretation of active hope and an undetermined future, rather than another general account of alienation. **Supports:** Change without inevitable progress, hopeful commitment without prediction, and the relation between human action and future possibilities; T4, T6.

## Simone de Beauvoir — six primary sources

### B01 · Primary · Simone de Beauvoir

**Exact work:** Simone de Beauvoir, *The Ethics of Ambiguity*. French original 1947; translated by Bernard Frechtman, 1948. [Consulted text](#).

**Examination:** Parts I-III, with particular attention to ethical attitudes, oppression, action, and irreversibility. **Why selected:** The central articulation of ambiguity and the relationship between one's freedom and the freedom of others. **Supports:** Situated projects, ethical freedom, limits of blame, absence of final justification, and unreconciled loss; T1-T7.

### B02 · Primary · Simone de Beauvoir

**Exact work:** Simone de Beauvoir, "Pyrrhus and Cineas" (1944), translated by Marybeth Timmermann, in *Philosophical Writings*, edited by Margaret A. Simons with Marybeth Timmermann and Mary Beth Mader. University of Illinois Press, 2004, pp. 89-149. [Consulted collection](#).

**Examination:** Finite projects, appeal, action for others, and responsibility for conditions; especially pp. 125-128. **Why selected:** Supplies the original argument for the relational future of projects and limits on acting in another's place. **Supports:** Meaning, dependence, reciprocity, help, and control; T2, T4-T5, T8. Its early interior/exterior distinction is not equated with her later position.

### B03 · Primary · Simone de Beauvoir

**Exact work:** Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex* (1949), translated and edited by H. M. Parshley, 1953; consulted excerpted text from the Penguin 1972 edition. [Introduction](#) and [conclusion](#).

**Examination:** Introduction and conclusion only, in the older abridged translation. **Why selected:** Directly grounds oppression, concrete opportunities, otherness, and reciprocity beyond the earlier ethical essays. **Supports:** Freedom versus satisfaction, social production of limitation, situated identity, and reciprocal recognition; T1, T3, T5. More detailed embodiment claims are supported by B07 and B11, not falsely attributed to unexamined chapters.

#### **B04 • Primary • Simone de Beauvoir**

**Exact work:** Simone de Beauvoir, “An Eye for an Eye” (1946), translated by Kristana Arp, in *Philosophical Writings*. University of Illinois Press, 2004, pp. 245–259. [Consulted collection](#).

**Examination:** The argument concerning vengeance, punishment, circumstances, the offender’s humanity, and irreversible harm. **Why selected:** Tests responsibility under morally difficult conditions and prevents turning Beauvoir into an uncomplicated advocate of forgiveness. **Supports:** Limits of explanation and excuse, acknowledgment, punishment, possibility of change, and irreparable loss; T2, T6–T7.

#### **B05 • Primary • Simone de Beauvoir**

**Exact work:** Simone de Beauvoir, “Moral Idealism and Political Realism” (1945), translated by Anne Deing Cordero, in *Philosophical Writings*. University of Illinois Press, 2004, pp. 175–193. [Consulted collection](#).

**Examination:** The criticism of moral purity and political necessity, and the relation of means to ends. **Why selected:** Establishes why neither abstention nor historical inevitability releases the agent from ethical judgment. **Supports:** Political responsibility, uncertainty, harm, and limits of control; T1–T2, T4, T7–T8.

## B06 · Primary · Simone de Beauvoir

**Exact work:** Simone de Beauvoir, “Existentialism and Popular Wisdom” (1945), translated by Marybeth Timmermann, in *Philosophical Writings*. University of Illinois Press, 2004: original essay pp. 203–216, with editorial notes later in the section. [Consulted collection](#).

**Examination:** Original essay, excluding the separately appended 1948 preface beginning on p. 216. **Why selected:** Provides the critique of fatalism and fixed identities and the need to renew commitment. **Supports:** Socially inherited common sense, becoming, the absence of final guarantees, and refusal of identities that excuse future conduct; T3–T4, T6.

## Simone de Beauvoir — six secondary sources

### B07 · Secondary · Simone de Beauvoir

**Exact work:** Debra Bergoffen and Megan Burke, “Simone de Beauvoir.” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, substantive revision 11 January 2023. [Academic reference entry](#).

**Examination:** Sections on ethics, embodiment, *The Second Sex*, and the development of Beauvoir’s thought. **Why selected:** A necessary authoritative reference for connections across genres and periods that the bounded primary selection cannot establish alone.

**Supports:** Intellectual development, ambiguity, embodiment, oppression, and reciprocity; T1, T3, T5–T6. This is the sole general encyclopedia entry in the corpus.

### B08 · Secondary · Simone de Beauvoir

**Exact work:** Kristana Arp, “Conceptions of Freedom in Beauvoir’s *The Ethics of Ambiguity*.” *International Studies in Philosophy* 31, no. 2 (1999): 25–34. [Author-hosted article](#).

**Examination:** The distinctions among ontological, concrete, and ethical freedom. **Why selected:** Prevents conflating the structure of human existence, effective opportunities, and ethically justified conduct. **Supports:** The precise meanings of freedom, moral agency, and responsibility toward other freedoms; T1-T2, T4. The article's comparisons with other philosophers are not expanded here.

### **B09 · Secondary · Simone de Beauvoir**

**Exact work:** Sonia Kruks, introduction to "Moral Idealism and Political Realism," in *Philosophical Writings*. University of Illinois Press, 2004, pp. 167-173. [Consulted contribution](#).

**Examination:** Complete introduction. **Why selected:** A focused specialist assessment of early ethical abstraction and the unresolved practical problem of judgment. **Supports:** Development, political means and ends, responsibility under uncertainty, and the limits of a purely abstract appeal to freedom; T1-T2, T4, T7-T8.

### **B10 · Secondary · Simone de Beauvoir**

**Exact work:** Debra Bergoffen, introduction to "Pyrrhus and Cineas," in *Philosophical Writings*. University of Illinois Press, 2004, pp. 79-87. [Consulted contribution](#).

**Examination:** Complete introduction. **Why selected:** Identifies both the relational strength and the problematic interior/exterior distinction in the early essay. **Supports:** Appeal, finite projects, material conditions, development toward a more embodied account, and limits of harmonizing early and later texts; T1, T4-T6.

### **B11 · Secondary · Simone de Beauvoir**

**Exact work:** Penelope Deutscher, "Bodies, Lost and Found: Simone de Beauvoir from *The Second Sex* to Old Age." *Radical Philosophy* 96 (1999): 6-16. [Article text](#).

**Examination:** Analysis of embodiment, aging, limitation, and the attribution of evasion or responsibility. **Why selected:** Tests the limits of freedom rhetoric at the body rather than merely adding another exposition of ambiguity. **Supports:** Situated embodiment, oppression, aging, and difficulties in distinguishing limitation from bad faith; T1–T3, T6–T7. Discussion of Old Age is explicitly secondary; that book is not an additional primary reference.

## B12 · Secondary · Simone de Beauvoir

**Exact work:** Tove Pettersen, “Acting for Others: Moral Ontology in Beauvoir’s ‘Pyrrhus and Cineas’.” *Simone de Beauvoir Studies* 26 (2009–2010): 18–27. [Publication record](#); [examined author preprint](#).

**Examination:** Author’s article text; the accessible preprint contains editorial markings, so no uncertain wording is quoted. **Why selected:** Offers a focused account of help, devotion, power, and the other’s independence. **Supports:** Responsibility for conditions rather than another’s inner project, ambiguity of care, reciprocal freedom, and limits of control; T2, T5, T8.

## Hartmut Rosa — six primary sources

### R01 · Primary · Hartmut Rosa

**Exact work:** Hartmut Rosa, “Social Acceleration: Ethical and Political Consequences of a Desynchronized High-Speed Society.” *Constellations* 10, no. 1 (2003): 3–33. DOI: 10.1111/1467-8675.00309. [Original article reproduction](#).

**Examination:** The original article, including the three forms of acceleration, desynchronization, and consequences for autonomy and identity; host-generated summaries are excluded. **Why selected:** Grounds Rosa as a social theorist and distinguishes acceleration from a vague complaint about busyness. **Supports:** Socially organized constraint, time, political possibilities, and identity; T1, T3, T6.

## R02 • Primary • Hartmut Rosa

**Exact work:** Hartmut Rosa's interview responses in Carl Cassegård, Karl Malmqvist, and Christian Ståhl, "Toward a Resonant Society: An Interview with Hartmut Rosa." *Sociologisk Forskning* 60, no. 2 (2023): 177–195. [Journal text](#).

**Examination:** Rosa's answers in the interview section, especially on social and political conditions; the interviewers' introductory exposition is not counted as primary evidence. **Why selected:** Makes the institutional and democratic implications explicit, countering a private-wellness interpretation. **Supports:** Social conditions of resonance, agency, autonomy, and the limits of individualizing change; T1–T2, T5, T8.

## R03 • Primary • Hartmut Rosa

**Exact work:** Hartmut Rosa, "The Idea of Resonance as a Sociological Concept." *Global Dialogue*, International Sociological Association, 9 July 2018. [University-hosted reproduction](#).

**Examination:** Original author essay. **Why selected:** A compact primary definition of resonance's moments and axes, not an anonymous popular summary. **Supports:** Affection, responsive efficacy, transformation, uncontrollability, and interpersonal, material, and existential relations; T4–T5, T8.

## R04 • Primary • Hartmut Rosa

**Exact work:** Hartmut Rosa's responses in Thijs Lijster, Robin Celikates, and Hartmut Rosa, "Beyond the Echo-Chamber: An Interview with Hartmut Rosa on Resonance and Alienation." *Krisis* 39, no. 1 (2019): 64–78. [Journal record and text](#).

**Examination:** Rosa's answers on autonomy, alienation, distinct voices, and the limits of the autonomy ideal. **Why selected:** Directly tests whether resonance supplements or displaces self-determination. **Supports:** Autonomy, receptivity, echo versus

encounter, relationship, and the limits of control; T3–T5, T8. Interviewer questions are contextual prompts, not independent evidence.

### R05 · Primary · Hartmut Rosa

**Exact work:** Hartmut Rosa, “Dynamic Stabilization, the Triple A. Approach to the Good Life, and the Resonance Conception.” *Questions de communication* 31 (2017): 437–456. DOI: 10.4000/questionsdecommunication.11228. [Article text](#).

**Examination:** Institutional argument, availability/accessibility/attainability, resonance, stable axes, and the place of nonresonant relations. **Why selected:** Connects social reproduction with an alternative evaluation of the good life. **Supports:** Dynamic stabilization, limits of resource accumulation, conditions of resonance, and the insufficiency of slowing down; T1, T3–T8.

### R06 · Primary · Hartmut Rosa

**Exact work:** Hartmut Rosa, “Resonance as a medio-passive, emancipatory and transformative power: a reply to my critics.” *The Journal of Chinese Sociology* 10 (2023), article 16. [Full article](#).

**Examination:** Reply on activity and receptivity, autonomy, transformation, disability, ethical objections, and uncontrollability. **Why selected:** Prevents treating objections as unanswered when Rosa directly addresses them, without assuming his reply settles the debate. **Supports:** The qualified contemporary formulation of resonance and its limits; T1–T2, T4–T8.

## Hartmut Rosa — six secondary sources

### R07 · Secondary · Hartmut Rosa

**Exact work:** Charles Taylor, “The Ethical Implications of Resonance Theory.” *The Journal of Chinese Sociology* 10 (2023), article 14. [Full article](#).

**Examination:** The ethical significance of receptivity and the implications for shared life. **Why selected:** Clarifies what resonance adds to an exclusively active picture of agency. **Supports:** Autonomy, openness, ethical implications, and social conditions; T4–T5, T8. Taylor appears solely as an interpreter of Rosa, not as an additional thinker in the monograph.

### R08 · Secondary · Hartmut Rosa

**Exact work:** Frédéric Vandenberghe, “Tuning into Hartmut Rosa’s Systematic Romanticism.” *The Journal of Chinese Sociology* 10 (2023), article 12. The spelling “Harmut” reproduces the published title. [Full article](#).

**Examination:** The critique of resonance’s normative and systematic ambitions. **Why selected:** Tests whether ethical judgments are established by resonance or presupposed in its definition. **Supports:** Limits of moral inference from experience, exclusionary togetherness, and disputed normative authority; T3–T5, T7–T8.

### R09 · Secondary · Hartmut Rosa

**Exact work:** Tsuo-Yu Cheng, “On the quadrants of the thing-world relations: a critical revision of Hartmut Rosa’s resonance theory in terms of thing-world.” *The Journal of Chinese Sociology* 10 (2023), article 11. [Full article](#).

**Examination:** Criticism of an overly binary classification of relations with things. **Why selected:** Adds a specific challenge about ordinary and instrumental relations not supplied by the other critics.

**Supports:** Limits of the resonance/alienation opposition and the legitimacy of some practical control; T8. Its alternative theoretical program is not developed into a new research topic.

### **R10 · Secondary · Hartmut Rosa**

**Exact work:** Amanda Anderson, “The moral and political challenges of Hartmut Rosa’s theory of resonance.” *The Journal of Chinese Sociology* 10 (2023), article 6. [Full article](#).

**Examination:** Moral and political objections, including individualization, exclusion, and the relationship between personal experience and social transformation. **Why selected:** Supplies a forceful test of whether resonance theory adequately links lived relations with justice. **Supports:** Institutional responsibility, disability-related objections, limits of personal remedies, and normative incompleteness; T1–T2, T5, T7. Read in conjunction with Rosa’s R06 response.

### **R11 · Secondary · Hartmut Rosa**

**Exact work:** Geir Sigurðsson and Paul J. D’Ambrosio, “Ritualized world relations: a Confucian critique of Rosa’s limitations on resonance.” *The Journal of Chinese Sociology* 10 (2023), article 4. [Full article](#).

**Examination:** The focused objection concerning cultivated, ordinary, repeated practices. **Why selected:** Tests whether resonance is cast too exclusively as exceptional encounter or individual voice. **Supports:** Habit, continuity, practice, and the relation between preparation and uncontrollability; T6, T8. No separate reconstruction of Confucian philosophy or additional bibliography is introduced.

**R12 · Secondary · Hartmut Rosa**

**Exact work:** Simon Susen, “The Resonance of Resonance: Critical Theory as a Sociology of World-Relations?” *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 33 (2020): 309–344; online publication 2019. [Full article](#).

**Examination:** Systematic reconstruction and criticism of the architecture and reach of resonance theory. **Why selected:** Provides a broad scholarly check distinct from the more narrowly targeted objections above. **Supports:** Social critique, alienation, universality and context, and the relation between resources and the good life; T1–T4, T8.

**Final quality audit**

| Requirement                  | Result                                                                                       |
|------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Total substantive references | <b>48</b> , F01–F12, E01–E12, B01–B12, R01–R12                                               |
| Allocation per thinker       | <b>12 each: 6 primary + 6 secondary</b>                                                      |
| Primary / secondary totals   | <b>24 / 24</b>                                                                               |
| Independent position files   | <b>4</b> , each covering all <b>13</b> requested dimensions                                  |
| Final central tensions       | <b>8</b> , T1–T8                                                                             |
| Comparative matrix           | <b>32</b> thinker–tension positions, with disagreement and complementarity for every tension |
| Contemporary manifestations  | <b>2 per tension</b> , explicitly hypothetical applications                                  |
| Dialogue preparation         | <b>32</b> contributions, <b>2 sentences per thinker per tension</b> ; no fictional dialogue  |

| Requirement            | Result                                                                                                                                              |
|------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Claim traceability     | Position files, comparisons, criticisms, and flags linked to the closed corpus                                                                      |
| Quotations             | No invented quotations; interpretations are not presented as verbatim speech                                                                        |
| Historical fidelity    | Contemporary applications separated; internal developments and contested readings retained                                                          |
| Reduction checks       | Frankl exceeds attitude choice; Fromm exceeds anti-capitalism; Beauvoir exceeds constraint and gender; Rosa exceeds slowing and pleasant connection |
| Conflict preservation  | Normative foundations, conditioned agency, embodiment, loss, human nature, and the sufficiency of resonance remain unresolved                       |
| Flow Hijacked firewall | No synthesis or reconstruction of Tomer's position; only explicitly conditional flags                                                               |
| Access qualification   | F09 and E11 remain bounded previews; selected portions of longer works are disclosed; no assertion of cover-to-cover examination                    |

**Research boundary:** This dossier supplies a source-linked philosophical map for monograph development. Before publication, any verbatim quotation and its translation should be checked against the edition actually cited; the bounded-preview entries do not authorize claims about their unexamined pages. No additional references have been appended to this corpus.